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Abstract
An accumulator based on bilinear pairings was proposed at CT-RSA’05. In this paper, we first demonstrate that the
security model proposed by Lan Nguyen does lead to a cryptographic accumulator which is not collision resistant. Second
we show that we can provide collision-resistance by updating the adversary model appropriately. Finally, we propose an
improvement on Nguyen’s identity escrow scheme with membership revocation based on the accumulator by removing
the trusted third party.
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1 Introduction
A cryptographic accumulator is an algorithm allowing the aggregation of a large set of elements into a single value of
constant size. Accumulators were introduced by Belanoh and de Mare [5] in order to design distributed protocols without
the presence of a trusted central authority. Such constructions are used in time-stamping [5], fail-stop signatures [4], ring
signatures [11] and multicast stream authentication [12] for instance. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya introduced the notion
of dynamic accumulators which allow the addition and deletion of values from the original set of elements [8]. In 2005,
Nguyen [15] proposed a dynamic accumulator based on bilinear pairings to design ID-based ad-hoc anonymous identifi-
cation schemes and identity escrow protocols with membership revocation.
In this work, we demonstrate that, contrary to what was claimed in [15], Nguyen’s accumulator is not collision re-
sistant. Following his advice [17], we demonstrate how to modify the security model so that collision resistance can be
provided. Finally, we prove that it is possible to modify his identity escrow scheme based on the accumulator so that the
presence of a trusted third party is not required any longer.
∗This paper is a postprint of a paper accepted for publication in IET Information Security and is subject to
Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at IET Digital Library.
1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we recall the definitions and results from
the original paper by Nguyen [15]. In Section 3, we introduce our attack against the collision resistance of Nguyen’s
accumulator. In Section 4, we demonstrate that the security model modification proposed by Nguyen [17] does lead to a
collision resistant accumulator. Finally, we design our improvement on Nguyen’s identity escrow scheme in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall the definitions and constructions as they appear in Nguyen’s paper [15].
2.1 Notations and Terminology
Definition 1 A function f : N → R+ is said to be negligible if:
∀α > 0∃ℓ0 ∈ N : ∀ℓ > ℓ0 f(ℓ) < ℓ
−α
Definition 2 A function f : N → R+ is said to be polynomially bounded if:
∃α0 > 0 : ∀ℓ ∈ N f(ℓ) < ℓ
α0
We denote Zp the set of residues {0, . . . , p − 1} modulo p. We consider two additive cyclic groups G1 = 〈P1〉 and
G2 = 〈P2〉 as well as a cyclic multiplicative group GM. These three groups are assumed to have the same prime order p.
We assume that we have a bilinear pairing e : G1 ×G2 → GM such that:
1. ∀(P,Q) ∈ G1 ×G2 ∀(a, b) ∈ Zp × Zp e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)a b
2. e(·, ·) is not degenerated: e(P1, P2) 6= 1
3. There exists a computationally efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for every couple (P,Q) from G1 ×G2.
As in [15], we consider G1 = G2 (and thus P1 = P2) in the remainder of this paper. We have the following definition:
Definition 3 A bilinear pairing instance generator is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm G taking as input a
security parameter 1ℓ and returning a uniformly random tuple t = (p,G1,GM, e(·, ·), P ) of bilinear pairing parameters
defined as before where ℓ represents the length of the prime number p and G1 = 〈P 〉.
We now present the definition of accumulators and the collision resistance property as set by Nguyen in [15].
Definition 4 ([15]) An accumulator is a tuple ({Xℓ}ℓ∈N, {Fℓ}ℓ∈N), where {Xℓ}ℓ∈N is called the value domain of the
accumulator and {Fℓ}ℓ∈N is a sequence of pairs of functions such that each (f, g) ∈ Fℓ is defined as f : Uf ×Xextf → Uf
for some Xextf ⊃ Xℓ and g : Uf → Ug is a bijective function. In addition, the following properties are satisfied:
• (Efficient Generation) There exists an efficient algorithm G taking as input a security parameter 1ℓ and outputting
a random element (f, g) from Fℓ possibly together with some auxiliary information af .
• (Quasi-commutativity)∀(ℓ, (f, g), u, x1, x2) ∈ N×Fℓ×Uf ×Xℓ×Xℓ f(f(u, x1), x2) = f(f(u, x2), x1). For any
ℓ ∈ N, (f, g) ∈ Fℓ and X := {x1, . . . , xq} ⊂ Xℓ, we call g(f(· · · f(u, x1) · · · , xq)) the accumulated value of the
set X over u. The element f(· · · f(u, x1) · · · , xq) does not depend on the order of the elements to be evaluated and
is denoted f(u,X).
• (Efficient Evaluation) For any (f, g) ∈ Fℓ, u ∈ Uf and X ⊂ Xℓ with polynomially bounded size (as a function of
ℓ), g(f(u,X)) is computable in time polynomial in ℓ even without the knowledge of af .
Nguyen set the previous definition to generalize the accumulator constructions by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [8] and
Dodis et al. [11] where Uf = Ug and the bijective function g is the identity function. Then, he gave the following security
definition.
Definition 5 ([15] Collision Resistant Accumulator) An accumulator is said to be collision resistant if for every PPT
algorithm A, the function:
Advcol.acc.A (ℓ) := Prob
(
(f, g)
R
← Fℓ;u
R
← Uf ; (x,w,X)← A(f, g,Uf , u) |
(X ⊂ Xℓ) ∧ (w ∈ Ug) ∧ (x ∈ Xextf \ X) ∧ (f(g−1(w), x) = f(u,X))
)
is negligible as a function of ℓ. We say that w is a witness for the fact that x ∈ Xℓ has been accumulated in v ∈ Ug
whenever g(f(g−1(w), x)) = v.
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We now introduce the q-Strong Diffie Hellman (q-SDH) assumption as it was used by Nguyen to claim the security of his
construction.
Definition 6 The q-Strong Diffie Hellman (q-SDH) assumption states that for every PPT algorithm A, the function:
Advq-SDH
A
(ℓ) := Prob
((
A(t, P, s P, . . . , sq P ) =
(
c, 1
s+c
P
))
∧ (c ∈ Zp)
)
is negligible as a function of ℓ where t = (p,G1,GM, e(·, ·), P )← G(1ℓ) and s R← Z∗p.
2.2 Construction of the Accumulator
To generate an instance of the accumulator from the security parameter ℓ, we run the algorithm G on input 1ℓ to obtain a
tuple t and a uniformly chosen element s from Z∗p as in Definition 6. We construct a tuple t′ := (P, s P, . . . , sq P ) where
q is an upper bound on the number of elements to be accumulated. The corresponding functions (f, g) for this instance
(t, t′) are defined as:
f : Zp × Zp −→ Zp g : Zp −→ G1
(v, x) 7−→ (x+ s) v v 7−→ v P
This construction involves that we have:
Uf = Xextf = Zp Ug = G1 Xℓ = Zp \ {−s}
It is clear that f is quasi-commutative. In addition, for u ∈ Zp and a set X = {x1, . . . , xk} ⊂ Zp \ {−s} where k ≤ q, the
accumulated value g(f(u,X)) =
(
k∏
i=1
(xi + s)u
)
P is computable in time polynomial in ℓ from the tuple t′ and without
the knowledge of the auxiliary information s [15].
We now recall the security theorem demonstrated by Nguyen. Note that it is denoted as Theorem 2 in [15].
Theorem 1 ([15]) The accumulator related to the pair (f, g) defined above provides collision resistance if the q-SDH
assumption holds, where q is the upper bound on the number of elements to be accumulated.
3 Breaking the Collision Resistance
In this section, we construct a PPT algorithm A which breaks the collision resistance property of the accumulator with
non-negligible probability. Since this will contradict the result from Theorem 1, we will then show that the adversary
reduction model to the q-SDH assumption given by Nguyen was incorrect.
3.1 Our Attack
Algorithm Construction. According to Definition 5, the adversary is given the functions f and g as well as u and the set
Uf = Zp. We build the following algorithm:
Algorithm A
Input: The pair of functions (f, g) and the value u.
1. Compute s = f(1, 0)
2. Let k be any polynomial function of ℓ. Choose uniformly at random k+1 elements of Zp \{−s} denoted x1, . . . , xk, x
and set X := {x1, . . . , xk}.
3. Compute λ :=
k∏
i=1
(xi + s)umod p and µ := (x+ s)−1 mod p. Denote ξ := λµ mod p and set w := g(ξ).
Output: The triple (x,w,X).
Correctness of the output. Due to Step 2, we have: X ⊂ Xℓ and x ∈ Xextf \ X. From Step 3, we obtain: w ∈ Ug .
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By construction of X we have: f(u,X) =
k∏
i=1
(xi + s)u mod p. We also have ξ = g−1(w) since g is invertible. We obtain
the following equalities:
f(ξ, x) = (x+ s) ξ mod p
= (x+ s)λµ mod p
= (x+ s) (x+ s)
−1
λ mod p
= λ mod p
= λ
= f(u,X)
Therefore, we have: f(g−1(w), x) = f(u,X). In addition, the construction of the triple (x,w,X) is deterministic (the
value µ always exists since x 6= −s). So, we obtain:
Advcol.acc.A (ℓ) = 1
Running time. First, it should be noticed that any operation (addition, multiplication, inversion) in Zp can be done in
quadratic time as a function of ℓ [14]. That is, any of these arithmetic operations can be performed in O(ℓ2) bit operations.
Since k is a polynomial function of ℓ, we denote it as K(ℓ). We can also assume that picking one random element from
Zp \ {−s} requires polynomial time R(ℓ) (otherwise it would be computationally infeasible to construct a single family
of elements from Zp \ {−s} = Xℓ which is not a realistic assumption). Thus, Step 2 is executed in (K(ℓ) + 1)R(ℓ) bit
operations.
Since s has been obtained at Step 1 (using O(ℓ2) bit operations), one can get λ with k multiplications and k additions
in Zp representing O(K(ℓ) ℓ2) bit operations. Each of the two elements, µ and ξ, also needs O(ℓ2) bit operations to be
computed while g can be run in polynomial time G(ℓ). Therefore, the number of bit operations executed during Step 3 is
O(K(ℓ) ℓ2 + G(ℓ)).
As a consequence, the running time of A is:
O(ℓ2) + (K(ℓ) + 1)R(ℓ) +O(K(ℓ) ℓ2 + G(ℓ)) = O(K(ℓ)R(ℓ) ℓ2 + G(ℓ))
which is polynomial in the security parameter ℓ.
Therefore, A is a PPT algorithm breaking the collision resistance of the accumulator with non-negligible probability.
Thus, the accumulator is not collision resistant. We point out that A enables to construct many such triples (x,w,X).
3.2 Comments on the Original Security Proof
The issue in [15] is that the adversary is given access to f which enables him to break the computational assumption
as follows. According to Definition 6, an adversary trying to break the q-SDH assumption should only be provided with
(t, P, z P, . . . , zq P ). Nevertheless, the adversary model of the accumulator (Definition 5) allows to query both f and g.
As a consequence, it is easy for the adversary to obtain z by a single query to f as in Step 1 of A. Then, he can compute
(z + c)
−1
mod p in O(ℓ2) bit operations for any c. Finally, the adversary runs g on that inverse and obtain 1
z+c
P . This
means that the adversary can break the q-SDH assumption.
4 Ensuring Collision Resistance
In order to be immune against our attack, Nguyen suggested to allow the adversary the use of the composition g◦f instead
of both f and g [16, 17]. His proposed definition is as follows:
Definition 7 ([16]) An accumulator is said to be collision resistant if for every PPT algorithm A, the function:
Advcol.acc.A (ℓ) := Prob
(
(f, g)
R
← Fℓ;u
R
← Uf ; (x,w,X)← A(g ◦ f,Uf , u) |
(X ⊂ Xℓ) ∧ (w ∈ Ug) ∧ (x ∈ Xextf \ X) ∧ (f(g−1(w), x) = f(u,X))
)
is negligible as a function of ℓ. We say that w is a witness for the fact that x ∈ Xℓ has been accumulated in v ∈ Ug
whenever g(f(g−1(w), x)) = v.
In [15], the issue was that a PPT adversary Acol.acc. attacking the collision resistance of the accumulator had extra in-
formation (namely, a direct access to both f and g) with respect to a PPT adversary Aq-SDH trying to attack the q-SDH
assumption directly. We now demonstrate that it is not the case any longer for the security model based on Definition 7.
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Theorem 2 Let Acol.acc. be a PPT adversary attacking the collision resistance of the accumulator and let Aq-SDH be a
PPT adversary attacking the q-SDH assumption. Then, both adversaries have the same view of the q-SDH assumption.
Proof.
According to Definition 6, a PPT adversary Aq-SDH attempting to break the q-SDH assumption is given the elements t and
t′ where:
t = (p,G1,GM, e(·, ·), P )
t′ = (P, s P, . . . , sq P )
According to Definition 7, a PPT adversary Acol.acc. attempting to break the collision resistance of the accumulator is
provided with t (representing the construction parameters of the accumulator) as well as t′′ where:
t′′ := (g ◦ f,Uf , u)
In the case of Nguyen’s construction, we have: Uf = Zp. So, we can write:
t′′ = (g ◦ f,Zp, u)
We have to demonstrate that Acol.acc. (initially attacking the collision resistance of the accumulator) does not gain any ben-
efits from receiving t′ (i.e.Acol.acc. knows t, t′ and t′′) overAq-SDH who attacks the q-SDH assumption directly (i.e.Aq-SDH
only knows t and t′). In other words, we must prove that the extra knowledge t′′ does not give Acol.acc. any advantage with
respect to Aq-SDH when attacking the q-SDH assumption.
First, it should be noticed that Aq-SDH knows the group Zp (second component of t′) since he has knowledge of p as a part
of the parameter t.
Second, Aq-SDH can simulate the black-box g ◦ f from t and t′. Indeed consider (U ,X ) from Zp × Zp. We have:
(g ◦ f)(U ,X ) = g(f(U ,X )) = (X + s)U P = (X U)P + U sP
Since (P, s P ) are the first two elements of t′,Aq-SDH can compute (g ◦f)(U ,X ) in polynomial time for any input (U ,X ).
It remains to argue about the role of u. Assume that Acol.acc. designs an oracle O(t, t′, t′′). The previous two observations
allows us to rewrite this oracle as O(t, t′, u). According to Definition 7, u has been chosen uniformly at random from Zp
and then given to Acol.acc.. Nevertheless, Zp is also known to Aq-SDH. Thus, Aq-SDH can also draw elements uniformly at
random from Zp. As a consequence, the advantage of the algorithm O(t, t′, u) is equal to the advantage of the algorithm
O(t, t′, v) where v has been chosen uniformly at random from Zp by Aq-SDH.
Thus, the view of Acol.acc. (when he is given t′) is identical to the view of Aq-SDH.

The previous results shows that Aq-SDH can simulate the result of any algorithm Acol.acc. can design (since Aq-SDH can
directly construct g ◦ f while u is chosen uniformly at random over the set Zp which is also known to Aq-SDH). We can
now demonstrate the security of Nguyen’s accumulator similarly to [15].
Theorem 3 If the q-SDH assumption holds then the accumulator is collision resistant.
Proof.
Assume that a PPT adversary A can break the collision resistance of the accumulator with non-negligible probability. As
stated in [15], A can construct a set X = {x1, . . . , xk} ⊂ Zp \ {−z}, an element x ∈ Zp \ (X∪ {−z}) and W ∈ G1 such
that:
(x+ z)W =
[
k∏
i=1
(xi + z)u
]
P (1)
where the tuple challenge for the q-SDH assumption is (P, z P, . . . , zq P ). We will show that the PPT adversary A can
compute (x, 1
x+z
P ) with non-negligible probability.
Consider the formal polynomial f(Z) defined as:
f(Z) :=
k∑
i=0
fi Z
i =
k∏
i=1
(xi + Z)
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Since Zp[Z] is an Euclidean’s ring, there exists a (unique) pair (g(Z), c) from Zp[Z] × Zp such that: f(Z) = (x +
Z) g(Z) + c. If we write g(Z) as
k−1∑
i=0
gi Z
i then the previous equality is equivalent to the system:


1 x 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 x 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 · · · 0 1 x 0
0 · · · · · · 0 1 x
0 · · · · · · · · · 0 1




c
g0
.
.
.
gk−2
gk−1


=


f0
.
.
.
fk−1 − x
1


The (k + 1)× (k + 1) matrix is invertible. Since the coefficients f0, . . . , fk−1 only depend on x1, . . . , xk, the adversary
can compute the value c as well as the coefficients of g(Z). We have:
(1) ⇐⇒ W = [g(z)u]P + c u
x+z
P
(1) ⇐⇒ 1
x+z
P = 1
c
(
1
u
W − g(z)P
)
Since k ≤ q, the elements P, z P, . . . , zk P are public. Therefore, the adversary can compute g(z)P since:
g(z)P =
k−1∑
i=0
gi (z
i P )
which achieves the proof of construction of 1
x+z
P . As a consequence, the PPT adversary A was able to compute
(x, 1
x+z
P ) with non-negligible probability which means that A broke the q-SDH assumption.

5 Improvement to Nguyen’s Identity Escrow Scheme
In 1991, Chaum and van Heyst introduced group signatures to enable individual members to sign messages on behalf of
the whole group [10]. An identity escrow scheme [13] is actually an interactive version of a group signature scheme. We
propose an improvement on the modified version of Nguyen’s construction as the original scheme was found flawed by
Zhang and Chen [19]. Our proposed construction does not require the presence of a trusted third party while keeping the
efficiency of the original scheme.
5.1 Design of Nguyen’s Identity Escrow Scheme
An identity escrow scheme with membership revocation is a tuple IE = (GKg, UKg, Join, Iss, IEIDP , IEIDV , Open,
Judge, Revoke, Update, CheckArchive) of polynomial time algorithms, where GKg generates public parameters and se-
cret keys, UKg generates personal public and private keys for users (candidate members), the protocol (Join, Iss) allows
a user to join the group and get a membership secret key and a membership certificate, where Join represent the part
run by the user, Iss the part run by the Group Manager (GM) issuing certificates. The identity escrow’s main protocol
IEID = (IEIDP , IEIDV ) allows a group member to anonymously prove his membership, Open revokes an IEID transcript
to find the prover and Judge decides if the Open finds the right prover. The details of the notations are referred to [15].
This identity escrow scheme works as follows. Denote ℓ the security value. The construction parameters of the scheme
(p,G1,GM, e(·, ·), P ) are obtained by querying the bilinear pairing instance generator G on input 1ℓ (Definition 3). We
also require the existence of a collision resistant hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp [18]. The details can be found in [15].
GKg. A trusted third party uniformly chooses x, s, x′ from Z∗p and P0, G,H from G1. He computes Ppub := xP,Θ :=
e(G,G)x
′
and Qpub := sQ. He publishes the group public key as {P, P0, Ppub,H,G,Θ, Qpub}, and gives the GM the
issuing key (x, s) as well as the opening key x′.
(Join, Iss). When a user Ui wants to join the group, he runs an interactive protocol with the GM to obtain his secret key xi,
his identity ∆i as well as a pair (ai, Si) called certificate. That is, Ui selects his secret key xi and sends a committed value
xiP to the GM. The GM calculates Si = 1x+ai (xiP + P0) and transfers it back to Ui. The detailed description is referred
to [15]. These four elements satisfy e(ai P + Ppub, Si) = e(P, xi P + P0) and ∆i = e(P, Si). Suppose the current group
accumulated value is Vj−1. The GM computes the new accumulated value as Vj := (ai + s)Vj−1. The witness of Ui is
Wi,j := Vj−1.
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(IEIDP , IEIDV ). User Ui computes E := tG and Λ := ∆iΘt. Then, he can show knowledge of (ai, Si, xi,Wi,j) such
that e(ai P + Ppub, Si) = e(xi P + P0, P ) and e(aiQ+Qpub,Wi,j) = e(Q,Vj).
Open. To open an IEID transcript (E,Λ, . . .), the GM computes ∆i = Λ e(E,G)−x
′
and a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge of x′ so that Θ = e(G,G)x′ and Λ/∆i = e(E,G)x
′
.
5.2 Our Improvement
The properties an identity escrow (group signature) scheme must exhibit are unforgeability, anonymity, unlinkability,
traceability, collision resistance and exculpability [1, 9]. The latter means that neither a group member nor the GM can
sign any message on the behalf of another group member. At Asiacrypt’06, Cao [9] proposed an attack breaking the ex-
culpability of the Ateniese-Camenisch-Joye-Tsudik’s (ACJT) group signature [1]. In his attack, the GM can forge a valid
group signature on the behalf of Ui (for any i) since the GM can intentionally choose t := loga0 a (see [9] for details). The
reader may be aware of a recent reply to Cao by the designers of the ACJT scheme [3]. As they emphasize, the attack by
Cao only works when the GM is dishonest and the public parameters not verifiable (which was excluded in their original
work [1]).
Consider the case where the scheme parameters are non-verifiable and the GM is untrusted. To reveal the underlying
problem of Cao’s attack, let’s see another attack on the ACJT scheme as follows. Let eˆ and xˆ be as eˆ := k1 φ(n) and
xˆ := −t−1 + k2 φ(n) (for an appropriate selection of k1, k2 so that eˆ ∈ Γ and xˆ ∈ Λ, where Γ and Λ are integer intervals
defined in [1] ). Thus, we have Aeˆi ≡ 1 ≡ axˆ a0 mod n where Ai represents the identity of user Ui. The GM can generate
group signatures on behalf of Ui using (eˆ, xˆ).
In [15], this attack is not possible since the scheme parameters are set up by a trusted third party who distributes them to
the GM. Nonetheless, the security analysis there does not consider the behavior of the trusted third party which, as pointed
out in [6], will expose the scheme to unexpected attacks. Intuitively, there may be a simple method to foil such attacks, i.e.,
to generate public parameters P and P0 as output of some hash function mapping a binary string to a group element [7]. In
this case, however, a security proof of Nguyen’s scheme has not been provided. We propose below a simple improvement
requiring less calculation than querying such a hash function along with a proof of security. Our idea is to identify user Ui
by xi P instead of Si, as representing Ui by axi rather than Ai in the unpublished version of the ACJT scheme [2]. This
approach makes the construction resistant against an attack like Cao’s.
(Join, Iss). When a user Ui wants to join the group, he runs an interactive protocol with the GM to obtain his secret key xi,
his identity ∆i as well as a pair (ai, Si) called certificate. These four elements satisfy e(ai P+Ppub, Si) = e(P, xi P+P0)
and ∆i = e(P, xiP ). Suppose the current group accumulated value is Vj−1. The GM computes the new accumulated value
as Vj := (ai + s)Vj−1. The witness of Ui is Wi,j := Vj−1.
(IEIDP , IEIDV ). User Ui computes E := tG and Λ := ∆iΘt. Then, he can show knowledge of (ai, Si, xi,Wi,j) such
that e(ai P + Ppub, Si) = e(xi P + P0, P ) and e(aiQ+Qpub,Wi,j) = e(Q,Vj). Formally, this proof of knowledge is as
below:
PK{(ai, xi, t, rw, rs) :
e(P,Us)
aie(P,H)−rsaie(Ppub, Us)e(Ppub,H)
−rs = e(P, P )xie(P0, P ),
e(Q,Uw)
aie(Q,H)−rwaie(Qpub, Uw)e(Qpub,H)
−rw = e(Q,Vj),
E = tG,Λ = e(P, P )xiΘt, Rw = rwG, aiRw = rwaiG,Rs = rsG, aiRs = rsaiG},
where Uw = Wi,j + rwH , Us = Si + rsH , Rw = rwG, Rs = rsG, H is also part of the public key.
Here are the details of the construction. In Step 2 (See Page 14, Section 6.1 of [16]) do:
(a) IEIDP generates rs, rw, k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7 ∈R Zp and computes the following:
Uw = Wi,j + rwH , Rw = rwG, Us = Si + rsH , Rs = rsG, T1 = k3G
T2 = k1Rw − k5G, T3 = k1Rs − k7G, T4 = k4G, T5 = k6G
Π1 = e(P,Us)
k1e(P,H)−k7e(Ppub,H)
−k6e(P, P )−k2
Π2 = e(Q,Uw)
k1e(Q,H)−k5e(Qpub,H)
−k4
Π3 = e(P, P )
k2Θk3
(b) IEIDP −→ IEIDV : E,Λ, Uw, Rw, Us, Rs, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5,Π1,Π2,Π3.
(c) IEIDP ←− IEIDV : c ∈R Zp.
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(d) IEIDP computes in Zp: s1 = k1−cai, s2 = k2−cxi, s3 = k3−ct, s4 = k4−crw, s5 = k5−crwai, s6 = k6−crs,
s7 = k7 − crsai.
(e) IEIDP −→ IEIDV : s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7.
(f) IEIDV verifies if the following equalities are satisfied:
T1 = s3G+ cE, T2 = s1Rw − s5G, T3 = s1Rs − s7G
T4 = s4G+ cRw, T5 = s6G+ cRs
Π1 = e(P,Us)
s1e(P,H)−s7e(Ppub,H)
−s6e(P, P )−s2 [e(P0, P )/e(Ppub, Us)]
c
Π2 = e(Q,Uw)
s1e(Q,H)−s5e(Qpub,H)
−s4 [e(Q,Vj)/e(Qpub, Uw)]
c
Π3 = e(P, P )
s2Θs3Λc
Open. To open an IEID transcript (E,Λ, ...), the GM computes ∆i = Λ e(E,G)−x
′
and a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge of x′ so that Θ = e(G,G)x′ and Λ/∆i = e(E,G)x
′
.
The security of this proof of knowledge is easy to check given two (s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, c) and (s′1, s′2, s′3, s′4, s′5, s′6, s′7, c′)
where si 6= s′i for i = 1, ..., 7 and c′ 6= c.
Lemma 1 Under the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G1, the above IEID protocol is an honest-verifier perfect zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge of (ai, Si, xi,Wi,j , t) that E = tG and Λ = e(P, P )xi Θt, and e(ai P + Ppub, Si) =
e(xi P + P0, P ) and e(aiQ+Qpub,Wi,j) = e(Q,Vj).
Proof.
Soundness: The goal is to show that if the protocol accepts with non-negligible probability the proof of knowledge, then
a PPT prover must have the knowledge of (ai, Si, xi,Wi,j) satisfying the stated relations, under the Discrete Logarithm
assumption on G1.
Suppose the protocol accepts for the same commitment Uw, Rw, Us, Rs, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5,Π1,Π2,Π3 with two different
pairs of challenges and responses c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7 and c′, s′1, s′2, s′3, s′4, s′5, s′6, s′7. Let fi =
si−s
′
i
c−c′
, i = 1, ..., 7,
then the following equations are obtained according to the verification algorithms of the protocol:
f3G+ E = 0 (2)
f1Rw = f5G (3)
f1Rs = f7G (4)
f4G+Rw = 0 (5)
f6G+Rs = 0 (6)
e(P,Us)
f1e(P,H)−f7e(Ppub,H)
−f6e(P, P )−f2e(P0, P )/e(Ppub, Us) = 1 (7)
e(Q,Uw)
f1e(Q,H)−f5e(Qpub,H)
−f4e(Q,Vj)/e(Qpub, Uw) = 1 (8)
e(P, P )f2Θf3Λ = 1 (9)
From Equation (2) to Equation (9), we get:
E = −f3G,Λ = e(P, P )
−f2Θ−f3 . (10)
From Equations (3), (4), (5) and (6), we obtain: −f1f4G = f5G, −f1f6G = f7G. Then:
− f1f6 = f7, (11)
− f1f4 = f5 (12)
since G is a generator of G1.
From Equation (7), we get:
e(P,−f1Us + f7H)e(Ppub, f6H + Us) = e(−f2P + P0, P ),
Applying Equation (11), we obtain:
e(−f1P + Ppub, f6H + Us) = e(−f2P + P0, P ), (13)
Similarly, from Equation (8) and Equation (12), we get:
e(−f1Q+Qpub, f4H + Uw) = e(Q,Vj). (14)
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From Equations (10), (13) and (14), it is easy to see that if we set t = −f3, xi = −f2, ai = −f1, Si = f6H + Us,
Wi,j = f4H + Uw, they satisfy the relations stated in the lemma.
Zero-knowledge: The simulator chooses c, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7 ∈ Zp and computes
T1 = s3G+ cE, T2 = s1Rw − s5G, T3 = s1Rs − s7G
T4 = s4G+ cRw, T5 = s6G+ cRs
Π1 = e(P,Us)
s1e(P,H)−s7e(Ppub,H)
−s6e(P, P )−s2 [e(P0, P )/e(Ppub, Us)]
c
Π2 = e(Q,Uw)
s1e(Q,H)−s5e(Qpub,H)
−s4 [e(Q,Vj)/e(Qpub, Uw)]
c
Π3 = e(P, P )
s2Θs3Λc
It is easy to see that the distribution of the simulation is the same as the distribution of the real transcript.

Theorem 4 The above scheme provides non-frameability under the Discrete Logarithm assumption on G1.
Proof.
The corresponding theorem in [15] states that the original Identity Escrow scheme provides non-frameability if the Dis-
crete Logarithm assumption on G1 holds and the digital signature scheme (Ks, Sign, V er) is existentially unforgeable
against chosen message attack. In our improvement, we simplify the description by omitting the digital signature scheme,
whose purpose is to bind (in a non-repudiable manner) the transcript and the identity ∆i. We just assume this is the case,
i.e., ∆i = e(P, P )xi and the transcript are bound together. Then, we proceed to prove that if there is a PPT adversary
A breaking non-frameability of the above scheme, we can construct a PPT adversary B breaking the Discrete Logarithm
assumption over G1.
Suppose B is given a challenge P ∗ = zP randomly chosen from group G1 = 〈P 〉. The goal of B is to calculate z.
B constructs an instance of the above scheme by generating x, s, x′ ∈R Z∗p and P0, G,H ∈R G1 ensuring G is also a
generator of G1. B gives A the group public key {P, P0, Ppub = xP,H,G,Θ, Qpub = sQ}, the issuing key (x, s) and the
opening key x′.
B simulates a set of possible users {1, ..., q} where q is the upper bound on the group size. B chooses i∗ ∈R {1, ..., q} and
provides A access to the following simulated oracles the definitions of which can be found in [16]:
• SndToU(i,Min). If i 6= i∗, B just plays as an honest user i by executing Join as specified in Min. If i = i∗, B
simulates the (Join, Iss) protocol so that ∆i = e(P, P ∗).
• WReg, GSig, USK, CrptU, RevokeU, and Witness. B can simulate all these oracles because the knowledge of the
secret keys, except the case when USK(i∗) is queried.
If A succeeds with probability ǫ, then the probability that he can impersonate i∗ is at least ǫ/q. From the soundness of
the protocol (Lemma 1), B can extract (ai, Si, xi,Wi,j , t) so that E = tG, Λ = e(P, P ∗)Θt, e(ai P + Ppub, Si) =
e(xi P + P0, P ) and e(aiQ+Qpub,Wi,j) = e(Q,Vj), i.e., z = xi.

The security properties with regard to anonymity and traceability, as discussed in [15], also hold in the above scheme,
because the encryption part and the GM’s algorithms are identical.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we first constructed an algorithm breaking the collision resistance of the accumulator as defined in [15].
We showed that the original accumulator security model proposed by Nguyen allowed an adversary to break the q-SDH
assumption. Second, we demonstrated that the new security model suggested by Nguyen [17, 16] did not allow the ad-
versary to break the mathematical assumption so that the collision resistance of the accumulator is ensured. Finally, we
proved that it possible to remove the trusted third party of Nguyen’s identity escrow scheme based on the accumulator
while being safe against an attack similar to Cao’s.
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